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Acerca de algunas intuiciones relativistas
Pailos,Federico Matías;
An??lisis filos?3fico , 2009,
Abstract: marfarlane's relativism about knowledge attributions aspires to be a theory that explains why the central intuitions about them are correct. nevertheless, relativism is incompatible with the accuracy of some intuitions about stanley's cases, with conjunctions of them and with intuitions about cases in which there is less at stake from the assessor than what is at stake from the subject or the attributor. nevertheless, this doesn't establish a limit to the possibilities of relativism, but calls for an improvement of it.
Atribuciones de conocimiento, aspectos prácticos y nuevos casos de Stanley
Pailos,Federico Matías;
Revista latinoamericana de filosof?-a , 2010,
Abstract: stanley's interest-relative invariantism explains most of our intuitions by means of certain relevant examples. but if one postulates that the truth value of knowledge attributions is also relative to the practical situation of the utterer and the assessor, it is possible to explain why all our intuitions on these cases (and not just on most of them) are correct. it is also possible to explain why all our intuitions on new stanley's cases (that explicitly take into account the practical situation of the assessor) are correct.
Atribuciones de conocimiento, aspectos prácticos y nuevos casos de Stanley
Federico Matías Pailos
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía , 2010,
Abstract: El Invariantismo Relativo al Interés de Stanley permite explicar la mayoría de nuestras intuiciones en torno a ciertos ejemplos relevantes. Pero si también se relativiza el valor de verdad de las atribuciones de conocimiento a la situación práctica del emisor y del evaluador, se puede rescatar todas estas intuiciones, y no solo la mayoría de ellas. Se puede, además, explicar nuestras intuiciones con respecto a nuevos casos de Stanley, en los que explícitamente se toma en consideración la situación práctica del evaluador. Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism explains most of our intuitions by means of certain relevant examples. But if one postulates that the truth value of knowledge attributions is also relative to the practical situation of the utterer and the assessor, it is possible to explain why all our intuitions on these cases (and not just on most of them) are correct. It is also possible to explain why all our intuitions on new Stanley's cases (that explicitly take into account the practical situation of the assessor) are correct.
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